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Recent Developments
Stanford v. Kentucky: IMPOSITION
OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT ON AN
INDMDUAL FOR A CRIME
COMMITI'ED AT SIXTEEN OR
SEVENTEEN YEARS OF AGE DOES
NOT VIOlATE EIGHTII AMENDMENT
In Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. _ ,
109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989), the Supreme
Court, in a plurality opinion delivered by
Justice Scalia, who was joined by Chief
Justice Reinquist, Justice White and Justice Kennedy, held that sentencing a
person to death for a crime committed
while the offender was sixteen or seventeen years of age did not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment as prohibited
by the eighth amendment. The Court reviewed legislative enactments concerning capital punishment to establish a
national consensus that such punishment does not violate evolving standards
of decency of modern American society.
The Court considered two consolidated cases. In the first case, Kevin Stanford was seventeen years old in January,
1981, when he and an accomplice repeatedly raped and sodomized a twenty yearold female attendant during the robbery
of a gas station. Afterwards, they drove
the attendant to a secluded area where
Stanford shot her, point-blank in the face
and in the back of the head.
A Kentucky statute provides that a juvenile can be tried as an adult if he is
charged with a Class A felony or capital
crime, or is over sixteen years of age and
charged with a felony. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 208.170 (MichieJBobbs-Merrill 1982).
Applying this statute, a Kentucky juvenile
court waived juvenile jurisdiction and
, transferred the case for trial as an adult.
Convicted of murder, first-degree sodomy, first-degree robbery and receiving
stolen property, Stanford was sentenced
to death and forty-five years in prison'.
Stanford, 109 S, Ct. at 2973. The Kentucky Supreme Court held, in affirming
the death sentence, that the juvenile
court had properly certified Stanford for

trial as an adult, since '''there was no
program or treatment appropriate for
appellant in the juvenile justice system. '"
[d. (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 734
S.W.2d 781, 792 (Ky. 1987).
In the second case, Heath Wilkins, at
the age of sixteen, in July, 1985, stabbed
to death a twenty-six year old mother of
two who was working in a convenience
store that she and her husband owned
and operated. Under Mo. Rev. Stat. §
211.071 (1986), which permits individuals between fourteen and seventeen
years of age who have committed felonies
to be tried as adults, the juvenile court
terminated juvenile-court jurisdiction
and certified Wilkins for trial as an adult.
After Wilkins entered 'gUilty pleas to
charges of first-degree murder, armed
criminal action and carrying a concealed
weapon, the trial court determined that
the death penalty was appropriate. The
Supreme Court of Missouri held that the
punishment imposed did not violate the
eighth amendment and affirmed the
sentence.ld. at 2974.
Both Stanford and Wilkins contended
that imposition of the death penalty on
criminals who were juveniles at the time
they committed their crimes, violated the
eighth amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. The
Supreme Court has interpreted the
eighth amendment "'in a flexible and
dynamic manner.'" [d. (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S, 153, 171 (1976», and
determined that a particular punishment
violates the amendment when it is contrary to the '''evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. '" [d. (quoting Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion».
To determine "evolving standards of
decency," the Court looked first to statutes passed by state legislatures. The
Court found that fifteen of the thirtyseven states allowing capital punishment
do not impose it on sixteen year old of-

fenders, and twelve of those states do not
impose it on seventeen year old offenders. Thus, the majority of states allowing
capital punishment do extend capital
punishment to sixteen and seventeen
year old offenders. The Court found similar congressional sentiment on this issue
reflected in 18 U.S.c. § 5032 (Supp. V
1982), which permits sixteen and seventeen year olds, after appropriate findings, "to be tried and punished as adults
for all federal offenses, including those
bearing a capital penalty that is not limited to eighteen year olds." [d. at 2976.
The Court concluded that, based on the
pattern of federal and state laws, the national consensus previously considered
sufficient to label a punishment cruel
and unusual had not been established.
Stanford argued both that the laws did
not establish a settled national consensus, and that the application of enacted
statutes should be considered by the
Court. Since the death sentence is rarely
imposed on persons under eighteen,
Stanford claimed that the death penalty
for such offenders was categorically unacceptable to prosecutors and jurors.
The Court held, to the contrary, that the
reluctant application of death penalty
statutes to minors indicated that the considerations which led Stanford to believe
that the death penalty should never be
imposed on offenders under eighteen
are the same considerations which lead
prosecutors and juries to believe that it
should rarely be imposed.ld. at 2977.
The Court was also unpersuaded by
Stanford's reliance on state laws which
set eighteen as the legal age for engaging
in activities such as driving, drinking alcoholic beverages, and voting. The Court
considered those laws irrelevant, because they operate in gross, i.e., they do
not conduct individualized maturity tests
for each driver, drinker, or voter. In contrast, the Court noted that the criminal
justice system requires individualized
consideration.
Twenty-nine States, including
both Kentucky and Missouri, have
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codified this constitutional requirement in laws specifically designating
the defendant's age as a mitigating
factor in capital cases. Moreover, the
determinations required by juvenile
transfer statutes to certify a juvenile
for trial as an adult ensure individualized consideration of the maturity
and moral responsibility of sixteen
and seventeen year-old offenders before they are even held to stand trial
as adults.
[d. at 2978.
Similarly, the Court rejected Stanford's reliance on public opinion polls,
the views of public interest groups and
the poSitions of professional associations
as indicia ofa national consensus, declaring them insufficient foundations on
which to rest constitutional law. "A ...
national consensus so broad, so clear
and so enduring as to justify a permanent
prohibition upon all units of democratic
government must appear in the operative acts (laws and application of laws)
that the people have approved." [d. at
2979.
Finally, the Court deemed it unnecessary to conduct a proportionality test: to .
examine whether "there is a disproportion between the punishment imposed
and the defendant's blameworthiness."
[d. at 2980. This test is used only where
there is objective evidence of a societal
consensus against the penalty; no such
evidence existed in this case. [d.
In a strong dissent, Justice Brennan
criticized the Court's reliance on legislative enactments to determine that the
capital punishment of sixteen or seventeen year old offenders did not offend
'''evolving standards of decency...· [d. at
2982 (quoting Trop v. Dulles) This approach returned to the task of defining
eighth amendment protection to the very
political majorities the framers sought to
deny such power. '''One's right to life,
liberty, and property, . . . and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome
of no elections.'" [d. at 2987 (quoting
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). Furthermore,
the dissent indicated that the plurality's
discussion of state laws was distorted
since it failed to account for the fifteen
states (and the District of Columbia)
which do not authorize capital punishment at all. [d. at 2982-83.
Justice Brennan also characterized the
Court's review of legislative enactments
to establish a national consensus as incomplete. He argued that the rare application of the death sentence for youthful
offenders, the decisions of respected
organizations in relevant fields that the
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penalty was unacceptable, and its rejection by governments around the world,
were strong indications that the execution of adolescents violated contemporary standards of decency and should
have been included in the Court's
analysis. [d. at 2984-85.
The dissent criticized the plurality's
refusal to conduct proportionality analysis. "There can be no doubt at this point
in our constitutional history that the
eighth amendment forbids punishment
that is wholly disproportionate to the
blameworthiness of the offender." [d. at
2987. The dissent noted that in American
society, juveniles are treated differently
from adults. As a class, they do not have
the level of maturation and responsibility
presumed in adults. "'The reasons why
juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also
explain why their irresponsible conduct
is not as morally reprehensible as that of
an adult. ..• [d. at 2988 (quoting 7bompsonv. Oklahoma, 487 U.S._, 108S.Ct,
2687,2699 (1988)). In Brennan's view,
"[j]uveniles very generally lack that degree of blameworthiness that is ... a constitutional prerequisite for the imposition of capital punishment under our
precedents concerning the eighth
amendment proportionality principle."
[d. at 2992.
In a plurality opinion, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that the imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were sixteen or seventeen years
old at the time they committed their
crimes did not violate the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment, because such penalty was not considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted, and no national consensus
against the execution of such youthful
offenders had been established.
-Mary Jo Murphy
Gray v. State: COURT UPHELD
TRlALJUDGE'S DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO REQUIRE A
PROSECUTOR TO TESTIFY OR BE
CROSS-EXAMINED FOR ALLEGED
DISCRIMINATION IN SELECTING
JURORS
In Gray v. State, 317 Md. 250, 562 A.2d
1278 (1989), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a prosecutor is not
required to testify under oath or be subjected to cross-examination when offering non-discriminatory explanations for
the striking of black venire persons from
the jury panel.
Isaac Gray, a black male, \!las tried in
the Circuit Court for Howard County for
the first degree rape of a white woman.

Upon completion of the jury selection
process, Gray moved for a mistrial, alleging that since the prosecutor had used
four of his peremptory challenges to
strike black jurors from the panel, the
state must advance an explanation for
these challenges. [d. at 252-53, 562 A.2d
at 1279. Relying on Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202 (1965), the trial judge held
that a prosecutor was not required to
give explanations for the exercise of peremptory challenges. Gray, 317 Md. at
253 n.2, 562 A.2d at 1279 n.2. Despite
the court's ruling, the prosecutor volunteered a non-discriminatory reason for
one of his strikes and noted that the jury,
as impaneled, included one black juror
and one black alternate juror. [d. at 253,
562 A.2d at 1280. The trial judge denied
the defendant's motion and Gray was
subsequently convicted.
Gray filed a motion for a new trial. At
the hearing, Gray argued that Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), decided
after Gray's trial on the merits, was applicable to the facts of his case. Gray, 317
Md. at 253, 562 A.2d at 1280. Batson
held that where the totality of the circumstances surrounding a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges established a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the burden was on the state to
justify the challenges with a non-discriminatory explanation. Gray argued
that a prima facie showing had been
established and, therefore, the state was
required to provide a racially neutral reason for the challenge. The prosecutor
denied the allegations of discrimination
and stated his reasons for striking each of
the black jurors. The trial judge denied
the motion for a new trial, based on his
belief that Batson was not meant to be
applied retroactively, and that, notwithstanding Batson, the ratio of black
jurors to the other jurors exceeded the
ratio of blacks to all persons living in the
county at that time. [d. at 253-54, 562
A.2d at 1280.
On appeal, the court of special appeals
vacated the judgment and remanded the
case for a determination of whether Gray
had established a prima facie showing of
racial discrimination, and, if so, whether
the state had sufficiently rebutted the
showing, in accord with the two-part test
of Batson. [d. at 254,562 A.2d at 1280. At
this hearing, counsel for the defendant
requested, pursuant to a witness subpoena which had been served on the
prosecutor, that the prosecutor be
placed under oath before giving his reasons for his jury strikes and that while
under oath, he be subject to cross-examination. Gray argued that there was a
guaranteed right to an adversarial hear-

